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CD. HERRERA

THE OTHER HUMAN-SUBJECT EXPERIMENTS

ABSTRACT. ^.Although deceptive psycholpgy_ex£erimerits_reoeiv.e less^attention..than somefonngjaLmedieal-research, they pose simikr,ij\Qral .challengesJJiese
d\ailengSjiaiiJy-€oncem-the us§_ of human subjects^and intentional deception. ,
Psychologists provide an argument to justify this deception. But what is an
essentially utilitarian argument too often includes faulty comparisons and
dubious accounts of risks and benefits. Commentators in other areas of humansubject research might examine this argument and the assumptions behind it.
Bioethics commentators seem especially well-positioned for this task.
Key Wortls: deception, human experiments, psychology, utilitarianism

I. A SKETCH OF THE PROBLEM

Experimental psychologists offer a utilitarian argument to justify
their intentional deception of research subjects. The argument
rests mainly on einpiric^al claims about.a-positive balance of pjrpposeSTHenefits over actual harms f
ct research is fairly welLcovered in bioethics j^iterjture, deceptive psychology experiments (DPEs) and
tKe accompan5dng justification argument receive scant attention
(feHluaQn::psydh.ologists.i.I will try in4;his essay to highlight some
problematic features of the prevailing argument, and suggest
areas that are ready-made for the degree of attention that human
experimentation typically receives in bioethics literature.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE DPE DEBATE

The utilitarian argument begins with an assumption that in some
areas of experimental psychology, especially social psychology,
deceptive methods offer "the only feasible means of obtaining
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valuable data about various aspects of human behaviour...," and
that "when used with caution, temporary deception provides
[researchers] with an important, and necessary, tool for adding to
our store of knowledge about human behavior" (Baron, 1981, p. 9).
To this idea of methodological value, psychologists occasionally add an argument from comparison to show that deception is
generally harmless. Experimental deception is supposed to be
safer than the deception which subjects encounter outside the laboratory. And, psychologists add, experimental deception benefits
the deceived, as everyday deception rarely does (Gergen, 1973;
Milgram, 1977). Participation in a DPE is supposed to be much
safer than participation in other forms of research, especially
medical studies. The comparison usually assumes that medical
research is justified (and tiiat some of it is deceptive), and that
DPEs contribute to scientific progress without this degree of risk.
Hence, DPEs must be at le^st as justified. Einally, psychologists
sometimes compare themselves to medical researchers to imply
that in both fields there is a duty to conduct experiments. This
comparison is presented as if to support an inference that, not
deceiving where the deception would cause no long-term negative
effects, might restrict the search for scientific knowledge, something presumably more harmful than anything that happens
during a DPE.
Psychologists critical of DPEs respond with a different version
of the utilitarian position. They contend that DPEs expose subjects
to stress, discomfort, and embarrassment that benefits do not outweigh. Some critics question the methodological virtues of deception; perhaps it makes an already contrived situation more
artificial, and thereby diminishes the validity of any experimental
results. In what is neither an ethical nor a methodological point,
critics periodically warn that DPEs will tarnish experimental psychology's public image. Ultimately, non-psychologists upset over
deception might enforce revisions to the code of ethics and make
experimentation that much more difficult (Kelman, 1967; Gergen,
1973). Continued deception could also reduce the number of
prospective (i.e., naive) subjects. Lastly, claims that deception is
wrong in principle, that it undermines the respect or dignity of
subjects, sometimes accompany these warnings. Yet critics never
focus on these extra-utilitarian claims or present them very convincingly.^
We might note briefly that psychologists cite en\pirical evidence
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to defend DPEs against such claims. Psychologists ask subjects if
they mind deception. They examine participants for after-effects.
Summarizing nearly 50 years of follow-up research, one psychologist contends that "the evidence overwhelmingly reveals that
research participants do not mind being deceived or having their
privacy invaded" (Christensen, 1988, p. 671; cf. Fisher & Fyrberg,
1994; Sieber, et ah, 1995). Perhaps because there is only a vague
threat of DPEs becoming a public-image liability, psychologists
give this issue little notice. They might understandably dwell on
the continued institutional support DPEs receive as a more direct
(and empirical) measure of public sentiment. There have been few
substantive attempts either to investigate deception's effect on
experimental findings (Lawson, 1988, is one exception) or to
explore the ramifications that methodological weaknesses might
have on the overall justification argument. Here too there may be
no incentive to answer the charge, since each published report of a
DPE may "confirm" deception's utility. In short, ethical and
methodological critiques aside, deception remains "a necessary
commonplace in psychological research. One does not give subjects the California F Scale and ask them to 'fill out this test, which
shows how authoritarian you are'" (Rosenthal, 1966, p. 165).

III. SOME CONCERNS WITH THE ARGUMENT FOR JUSTIFIED DECEPTION

Experimental psychologists may have some warrant in assuming
that they are well-positioned to observe human behavior, assess
subject reports about experimental participation, and quantify
value statements concerning ethical reservations and physical or
emotional harm. Psychologists, by their own account, should
know best when to use deception and when it becomes harmful.
Psychologists should also understand parameters like experimental validity and public reputation. Yet granting the psychologist's
competence in these areas, there still appear to be flaws in the utilitarian argument for DPEs. In particular, several points deserve
additional scrutiny from psychologists, and especially bioethicists.
Most of these points concern the utilitarian argument and the
notion of comparing DPEs to other forms of deception.
A. The Utilitarian Argument. As psychologists present it, the utilitarian case relies on the psychologist's ability to assign values to
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risks and benefits from DPEs in a way that not only shows that
deception is useful (which seems beyond doubt), but demonstrates its ethical justification. Utilitarianism and risk-benefit
assessment vary according to the presuppositions of the person
who applies them. Simply claiming that experimental benefits
outweigh anticipated or even reported risks, only tells half the
story. Psychologists need operdy to describe their presuppositions,
and explain how these relate to the value commitments at issue.
The limitations of psychological explanation make this an ambitious project; the social sciences may not be able adequately to
quantify values regarding subject welfare or research objectives
(and psychologists currently are under no requirement to make
their calculations explicit). Still, psychologists might account for
ethical concerns that risk-benefit assessment cannot accommodate.
They might also explain references to the underlying ethical
theory and the evidence that serves as premises in the justification
argument. There is currently a question whether psychologists are
perhaps too selective in constructing the argument, and whether
they, for example, pay too little attention to the attitudes and
values of subjects who have not participated or been told of
deception's allegedly positive side.
This is not to say that psychologists should ignore the attitudes
of recently deceived subjects when attempting to justify deception.
The call for a stronger utilitarian argument simply reflects the possibility that psychologists are narrowly defining harm or restricting their search for relevant "effects." We may need an ancillary
argument, perhaps one from more social or public concerns, to
accept a lack of negative, empirical effects as proof of deception's
harmlessness. Reliance on empirical evidence may, in other words,
obscure some of deception's social meaning. A much stronger utilitarian case would be able to cite a broad range of evidence, and
locate the psychologist's justification within a sound public and
scientific framework. An explanation of real and expected values
would also strengthen the utilitarian case. This is especially so
where experimental participation may affect autonomy or selfrespect, two values that may defy utilitarian or risk-benefit calculations. There are risks that the utilitarian argument may not be
accommodating; there are other risks that may be difficult to conceptualize according to any ethical position. Consider, for instance,
the potential risk in institutionalizing deception, or in teaching
subjects to justify it in the name of science and higher learning.
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The foregoing comments apply to the risk side of the equation.
A clear conception of benefits from DPEs would also offer much
needed support for the utilitarian case. Benefits are, after all, supposed to cover any risks from deception; to the extent that there
are potential risks, there must be a genuine expectation of benefits.
Too often there is only the appearance of spurious benefits or
benefits that do not seem to have necessary connection to experimental participation. One psychologist contends that subjects
benefit by receiving an
interesting summary of relevant knowledge at the time of their participation
The researcher should also make a cheerful and friendly offer to discuss any of
the material with subjects, if they so desire. Such discussions are gratifying to
subjects, and sometimes provide researchers with valuable anecdotal information
that is useful in planning the next study or understanding the results of the
current study (Sieber, 1992, p. 101).

Given the academic setting of DPEs, it is hard to see why those
interested in psychological research would even have to participate as subjects in a non-deceptive experiment to receive benefits
such as this. Overstating the nature of the benefits comes close to
exploitation, even where subjects generally have positive feelings
about their experience. Bearing in mind that psychologists are
under no requirement to elaborate on the benefits of their deception, those who do seem nonetheless improperly to factor benefits
into the utilitarian proposal or impose their views of benefits (and
risks) onto subjects who are imlikely to argue otherwise. And if
there is something about the context of the DPE that prevents subjects from seeing that such benefits are often contingent on the
utility of the DPE, which is itself in question, this would raise a
further problem regarding informed consent.^
Bioethics commentators might also turn their attention to arguments critical of DPEs. Psychologists who argue against DPEs
often fail to present a coherent utilitarian position or a consistent
application of principles (see, esp.. Fisher and F)Tberg, 1994). The
most common errors involve misrepresenting the strengths of different versions of utilitarianism, or attempting to supplement utilitarianism with principles (e.g., respect for autonomy) that,
initially at least, confiict with basic consequentialist tenets. This
error not only mars otherwise good discussions of DPEs (e.g.,
Baumrind, 1979; 1985), it also detracts from formal documents like
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the Belmont Report (1978) and the psychologists' code of ethics
(American Psychological Association, 1992).* These documents
governing the treatment of research subjects urge psychologists to
balance risks and benefits while, for example, respecting the rights
and autonomy of the subjects. But psychologists are given equal
title to employ deception wherever they can rule out alternative
methods and ensure that the risk-benefit ratio will be favorable. It
is possible that a researcher can reconcile such values, but without
additional explanation, such documents seem to offer little guidance on a substantive ethical issue.
My final point about the utilitarian position is simply that commentators for and against DPEs too often present it as the only
opfion. Deontology seems particularly unwelcome, aside from the
occasional references to rights or autonomy. Interestingly, DPE
critics somefimes express the strongest apprehension towards
Kantian positions on deception. One warns that the deontological
position would be far more dangerous than the deception itself
(Gergen, 1973, p. 908). To others deontology threatens scientific
exploration and the right to research (Wulff, 1979), and only offers
"moral posturing" in return (Adair, et al, 1985, p. 65; Kimmel,
1979). Warnings go out to the "working experimental social psychologist," against "conceiv[ing] the issue in absolutist terms"
when he or she should be "well aware of the fact that there are
good reasons for using deception
" (Kelman, 1967, p. 210;
Oliansky, 1991). Once commentators (Elms, 1982; Rejniolds, 1979)
retell the story of Immanuel Kant's unwillingness to save a
friend's life by lying, it is imderstandable that deontology appears
"dogmatic" (Baumrind, 1985). Admittedly, deontology can seem
dogmatic in application (even to some Kantians). But one-line
refutations of deontology do nothing to shore up the utilitarian
position. Such partisanship might instead raise questions about
the thoroughness of the ethical inquiry.
B. The Argument from Comparison. The comparison between DPEs
and other alleged forms of deception also deserves comment. In
most cases it is probably inaccurate or at least ill-advised. In its
worst form the comparison implies that DPEs raise no special
problem.
Many of the ethical sermons being preached to social scientists seem to assume
that those participating in research projects would never encounter given dis-
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comforts if they did not participate in the research. This is, of course, ridiculous,
since such 'discomforts' are part of everyday life: any unfamiliar situation will
create anxiety, everyone finds it interesting to have 'private' information about
another, and deceptive information is presented at every turn, particularly in
advertising and political speeches... If social scientists were not so honest, subjects would not be aware of the deception and, hence, not so upset about their
treatment (Re5molds, 1972, p. 699).

Even the better comparisons may overlook a rather banal fact:
prospective subjects are never compelled to participate in either
medical or psychological research. They do not have to choose
between high- or low-risk deception; subjects do not have to participate at all. By the same token, physicians and psychologists
need not conduct any research, deceptive or otherwise. The
justification argument needs to begin from what is perhaps an
equally obvious, if often overlooked, point. Access to human subjects is a social and scientific privilege, and the deception of subjects represents a methodological decision, not a necessity.
As for the general comparison to other forms of supposedly
more harmful deception, psychologists need first to identify relevantly similar forms of deception, and more importantly to show
why these should serve as a benchmark. For example, there are
ethical questions surrounding medical research such as
Randomized Clinical Trials, but this research may not involve the
kind of "deception" that the psychologist's comparison suggests.
And even if we view placebos, for example, as an instance of misleading information (e.g., Sieber, 1992), it remains unclear whether
placebos are ethically or methodologically comparable to anything
that occurs in a DPE. The comparison to everyday deception fails
for a similar reason. It makes no sense to judge the DPE by standards that are supposed to be excessive, or to base a comparison
on the reality of unavoidable deception outside the lab. In any case,
it is possible to interpret the argument from comparison quite differently; if non-experimental deception is so pervasive, would this
not support a decision to avoid it where possible, and to rule it out
of psychological research entirely? Does it matter, in addition, that
deception generally rims counter to science and academics?
We should also reserve judgment on the claim that psychologists, like medical researchers, have what amounts to a duty to
deceive. Setting aside the question of whether medical research
ever involves comparable "deception," such a duty could only
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apply to either profession if it was derivative of a broader duty to
conduct research. There might well be such a vague duty where
scientists can adequately project the likely outcomes (positive or
negative) of their research, but it may be asking too much of
science or the idea of research justification to expect this duty to
exert more than metaphorical force. And lacking a strong utilitarian argument to the contrary, there would be no reason to allow a
duty regarding deception or the pursuit of knowledge to supersede duties to individual research subjects. Indeed, a utilitarian
case argues against the idea of a duty to deceive, since that duty
might lead to other deviations from informed consent or ordinary
morality. In particular, the duty to deceive could make informed
consent appear as an unreasonable impediment to fulfilling a perceived obligation, as happened in some notorious examples from
the history of medical research, such as the Tuskegee
studies (Pence, 1990).^

IV. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH TO DPEs

I have indicated a few problematic details of the justification argument for DPEs, with emphasis on those that seem especially
suited to mainstream concerns in bioethics, primarily because the
debate over DPEs is ready-made for the critical attention that
bioethics commentators give to other forms of human-subject
research. And were commentators in applied ethics to join this
debate, we might approach a more satisfactory ethical position on
DPEs. There is, for example, a healthy utilitarian tradition in
bioethics, one that accommodates prospective subject welfare and
seeks to reapportion the power in the laboratory (e.g., Ramsey,
1970; Veatch, 1987). Reapportioning in the DPE context could
involve increasing the collaboration between psychologist and
subject, or fundamentally altering the social context of the
research. In this light, it is encouraging that some psychologists
occasionally suggest a similar reorientation towards researchersubject interaction (Kelman, 1972; Schuler, 1982). It may be premature to talk of the prospect of an interdisciplinary model of
human-subject research ethics, but the time seems right at least to
enlist the interest of those who comment on medical and other
forms of human-subject research now.^
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NOTES
* Though Macklin and Sherwin (1975) and Murray (1980) provide interesting
discussions from the bioethics perspective, Katz (1972) discusses some notorious
DPEs. Some discussions of human-subject research (e.g., Beauchamp and
Childress, 1994; Jonas, 1970) treat DPEs indirectly
^ Seeman (1969), however, argued against all DPEs in what he described as
"absolutist" terms, irrespective of consequences.
^ This gets further into the issue of philosophical limits of psychological explanation than I should go here. Suffice it to say that any accoimting of benefits presumes the integrity of the DPE. Some literature on psychological explanation
relates directly to the DPE (Harre, 1980; Meehl, 1967; 1990; Smith, 1976), though
there is typically little attention to ethics where commentators discuss philosophy of science issues.
* Blackstone (1975), Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (1985), Marshall (1986), and
Smith (1976) discuss the conflict of principles within formal documents covering
the use of deception. On the challenge of integrating something like Kantian
respect-for-persons into a consistent utilitarian position, see also Hayry (1994)
^ Though the question of deception is not the only issue in such examples. For
example, the decision to deceive or circumvent informed consent may represent
an attitude of minimal respect for persons.
* Kelman (1982) also suggests a model integrating subject rights into the utilitarian argument.
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